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From or Toward the Symbolic?
 
A Critique of Žižek’s The Sublime Object of Ideology 
 
 
Won Choi 
 
 
In her biography, Jacques Lacan, Elisabeth Roudinesco oﬀers us a sharp 
contrast between the positions occupied by Louis Althusser and Jacques 
Lacan as follows: “Lacan . . . had traveled in the opposite direction from 
Althusser. Hence his constantly renewed attachment to Lévi-Strauss’s idea of 
symbolic function. While Althusser believed that only by escaping from all 
filial symbolism could one achieve a founding act, Lacan showed that, on the 
contrary, while such an escape might indeed produce logical discourse, such 
discourse would be invaded by psychosis” (Roudinesco 1997, pp. 301-2). 
Many readers today may be dumbfounded by this passage, since the picture 
presented here about the two theorists is diametrically opposed to the picture 
they tend to hold true. In the latter picture, Althusser is depicted as an 
adamant structuralist who disallowed the subject any chance to escape from 
the dominant ideology, while Lacan is portrayed as a genuine critic of such a 
position, who, by stressing the irreducible dimension of the real, showed how 
the subject might be able to find a way to subvert the entire symbolic 
structure. 
Of course, this latter picture cannot simply be whisked away as a 
theoretically unfounded popular belief. Althusser indeed began to be 
criticized as a structuralist (or a functionalist) not long after his famous essay 
on “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” was published. This 
criticism seemed to receive its long waited foundation as well as its 
theoretical weight when Slavoj Žižek wrote The Sublime Object of Ideology to 
confirm its validity precisely by comparing Althusser’s theory with Lacan’s. 
Twenty years after its publication, we still see this text heavily determines the 
way in which both Althusser and Lacan are perceived by various academic 
communities. So much so that even a critic like Ian Parker, so unsympathetic 
toward Žižek, embraces the idea that the latter’s criticism of Althusser is 
valid and reliably represents Lacan’s own position (Parker 2004, p. 86). 
Should one think, then, that Roudinesco was simply mistaken? Much 
more recently, however, Yoshiyuki Sato made a similar argument in his 
Pouvoir et résistance by insisting that it is Lacan who took the most 
intransigent structuralist position in the whole debate that unfolded around 
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the question of the subject in France during the 1960s and 70s, and that the
 
theoretical works of (the later) Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida and Althusser all 
may be viewed as various attempts to distance themselves from such a 
position of Lacan’s. According to Sato (2007, p. 57), Lacan’s entire theory can 
be characterized by its emphasis upon the “absolute passivity” of the subject 
in relation to the symbolic structure. Should one think, then, that the current 
dominant picture which says otherwise is simply mistaken? 
In this article, I position myself among those who claim that Lacan was 
a much more orthodox structuralist than Althusser was; however, I 
simultaneously argue that it is crucial to see their agreements as well as their 
disagreements. In other words, we should begin our discussion by 
recognizing that structuralism itself was not a unified school of thought, and, 
therefore, the respective relationships that Althusser and Lacan developed 
with it cannot be thought of in a manner of all or nothing. Insofar as they 
both tried to move the category of the subject from a constituting position to a 
constituted one, Althusser and Lacan were both great structuralists (Balibar 
2003). They did not simply nullify the category of the subject (including its 
activity and autonomy) but tried to explain it by investigating through what 
process and mechanism the subject is constituted as one who recognizes 
itself as autonomous while still depending upon the structure in a certain 
way. Only after clearly delineating their common interest in this way can one 
possibly begin to inquire into the diﬀerent choices they made in their own 
theoretical works. 
In order to carry out such an inquiry, I propose to revisit Žižek’s 
discussion of the Althusser-Lacan debate in The Sublime Object of Ideology. 
While attempting to reply to some of the critical questions that he raised for 
Althusser, I aim to diﬀerentiate the issues on which Althusser and Lacan 
converged from those on which they diverged. Admittedly, this article is 
limited in its scope: it does not consider changes that occurred in Lacan’s 
theory in the 1970s,1 nor does it explore relevant questions raised by 
Althusser in some of his posthumously published writings (see, for example, 
Althusser 2003). I will leave a discussion of these important issues for 
another occasion. But in this article I still hope to show that it is important to 
locate Žižek’s misconceptions in order to reopen the debate in new light. In 
other words, I would like to make clear my intention which is not to 
 
 
1 However, it should be noted that, as long as The Sublime Object of Ideology is concerned, Žižek (1989, p. 
132) considers the final third period of Lacan to begin from the late 1950s. This gives me a plenty of space 
in which to question his reading of Lacan. 
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conclude but to begin the debate; by trying to return the theorists to the
 
places to which they properly belong, I intend to prepare a ground upon 
which they may eventually manifest their respective theoretical strengths as 
well as their weaknesses. 
 
 
1. Žižek’s Construal of the Althusser-Lacan Debate 
 
 
In the introduction to The Sublime Object of Ideology, Žižek points out that the 
famous contemporary debate between Habermas and Foucault represses 
another debate whose theoretical implication is far more important: the 
Althusser-Lacan debate. Žižek claims that the latter debate has been 
repressed because it brings to the forefront the issue of ideology which 
constitutes the “traumatic kernel” that the Habermas-Foucault debate does 
not want to face directly. According to him, each theorist in this double 
debate represents one of the “four diﬀerent notions of the subject” along with 
their respective “ethical position” (Žižek 1989, p. 2). Habermas’s subject is 
the linguistically revamped version of the “old subject of transcendental 
re&ection” whose universalistic ideal lies in establishing and mastering the 
transparent intersubjective communication; whereas Foucault’s subject is the 
aestheticized antiuniversalistic one whose tradition goes back to the 
Renaissance ideal of the “all-round” individual capable of mastering its 
passions and thus turning its own life into a work of art. Žižek argues that, 
despite the surface diﬀerence concerning universalism, they both enter the 
humanist tradition which highlights the supreme importance of the subject’s 
self-mastery or self-transparency. 
Althusser, on the other hand, represents a crucial break from this 
tradition insofar as he lays down the idea that the subject can never master 
itself because it is always in ideology that it recognizes itself; ideology in 
this sense is one of the fundamental conditions that accompany all its 
activities. Hence, the Althusserian subject, radically alienated “in the 
symbolic ‘process without subject’” (Žižek 1989, p. 3), is in fact a non-
subject more or less completely reducible to a mere eﬀect of ideology. To 
this Althusserian subject, Žižek opposes the Lacanian subject which is 
defined by the irreducible distance that separates the real from its 
symbolization. According 
to this view, there is always a remainder or a surplus that resists the 
“symbolic integration-dissolution”; this remainder is what in turn gives rise 
to the dimension of desire through which the subject finally comes across a 
chance to separate itself from the symbolic structure. From Žižek’s point of 
view, the 
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famous Lacanian motto, “not to give way on one’s desire,” which is attributed
 
to the indomitable tragic figure Antigone, sums up the ethical position 
proper to this kind of subject. It is not an attempt to return to the ethics of 
self-mastery, but on the contrary to subvert the symbolic structure that 
determines the very “self ” or the “ego.” Žižek (1989, p. 124) illustrates this 
diﬀerence between Althusser and Lacan by referring to the diﬀerence 
between the two levels installed in the Lacanian graph of desire. While 
Althusser limits himself to the lower level in which the “alienation” of the 
subject in the symbolic transpires, Lacan adds to this yet another level in 
which the dimension of the real (jouissance) is introduced, and thus the 
separation of the subject from the symbolic becomes conceivable. 
Although I am sympathetic towards Žižek’s view that emphasizes the 
importance of the Althusser-Lacan debate suppressed from the 
contemporary intellectual scene, nevertheless I am not in agreement with his 
way of characterizing the debate. There are at least two major problems that I 
see. The first one concerns the far too one-sided characteristic of the picture 
Žižek presents to us about the debate. Never trying to carefully reconstruct 
the way in which the debate actually unfolded, he is content simply to pass 
judgment on the alleged shortcomings of Althusser’s theory by imposing the 
Lacanian theoretical grid directly upon it. This imposition is problematic, not 
only because it ignores the respective ways in which the two theories were 
developed, but because it tends to give readers an impression that Lacan 
designed his theory, especially his graph of desire, at least in part to refute 
Althusser’s position, or that Althusser was criticized in a more or less 
unilateral manner by Lacan in this “debate.” 
To see such an impression is questionable, it suﬃces to take into 
account some of the relevant historical facts. Lacan’s essay that 
becomes 
Žižek’s central reference point in The Sublime Object of Ideology is, without 
doubt, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the 
Freudian Unconscious.” It was originally written as a contribution to the La 
Dialectique conference held at Royaumont in 1960; it was printed in Écrits in 
1966, just one year after the publication of Althusser’s Pour Marx and Lire le 
Capital. On the other hand, Althusser’s essay, “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses,” which becomes the major target of Žižek’s criticism, was 
written in 1969 (published in 1970). There was no significant reply from 
Lacan’s side to this essay. Rather it was Althusser who later made a criticism 
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of Lacan, especially in his 1976 essay “The Discovery of Dr. Freud.”2 Lacan
 
again did not reply. The only explicit criticism he ever made against Althusser 
is found in the first two sessions of his Seminar XVI (1968-69), which 
preceded the publication of Althusser’s essay on ideology by more than one 
year; naturally, it did not directly address the issues raised by Althusser’s 
formulation of “ideological interpellation.” 
Having this picture in mind, one might arrive at a hypothesis quite 
diﬀerent from Žižek’s own. His claim is that the graph of desire proposed by 
Lacan has two levels, while Althusser’s theory has only one; this contrast in 
and of itself shows the weakness of the Althusserian theory which 
overemphasizes the role of the symbolic (or the symbolic identification) and 
ignores the dimension of the real. However, if Lacan’s graph was proposed in 
1960, and Althusser’s thesis on ideology in 1969, is it not more likely the 
case that Althusser rejected the second level of the graph while accepting 
perhaps with certain modifications the first level only? Of course, one can 
still possibly argue that Althusser did not reject it, but rather simply missed 
it. However, as I already mentioned, he did make a criticism of Lacan in the 
1970s. Then is it not rather fair to check out the points of his criticism first? 
However, Žižek oddly enough never mentions this criticism or the essay in 
which it appears. 
The second problem closely connected to the first one concerns Žižek’s 
interpretation of the Lacanian graph of desire itself. He identifies the lower 
level with the symbolic, and the upper one with the symbolic cut through by 
the real. However, it seems much more appropriate to me to identify the 
lower level with the imaginary and the upper one with the symbolic. The real 
intervenes in the form of “anxiety” as some sort of catalyst to make the 
transition possible from the imaginary to the symbolic. In this perspective, it 
is Lacan who appears to insist on the necessity of the symbolic. Althusser, on 
the other hand, seems to problematize it by rejecting (or “missing”) the upper 
level in his theory of ideology. Hence, the crucial question we must ask 
ourselves is: are we moving from or toward the symbolic when we make a 
transition from the lower level to the upper level? By diﬀerentiating the 
symbolic that arrives in advance and the symbolic proper, I will try to show in 
this article that the lower level indeed represents the imaginary, while the 
upper one represents the symbolic. 
 
 
2 Althusser gave up trying to publish “The Discovery of Dr. Freud” after he received criticisms from his 
colleagues. Later, however, some publisher printed it out without acquiring permission from Althusser. This 
incident became known as the “Tbilisi Affair” (see Althusser 1996, pp. 79-124). 
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In The Sublime Object of Ideology, Žižek’s criticism of Althusser appears
 
at two diﬀerent places: initially in chapter 1, titled “How Did Marx Invent the 
Symptom?” and then again in chapter 3, titled “‘Che Vuoi?’” which 
specifically deals with the question of the two levels in the graph of desire. In 
the following section, I will discuss chapter 1, in which he alleges that 
Althusser missed the Kafkaesque dimension of the real, namely what he calls 
the “interpellation without identification/subjectivation.” In the last section, I 
will question Žižek’s interpretation of the graph of desire by engaging myself 
in a textual analysis of Lacan’s “The Subversion of the Subject.” 
 
 
2. The Encounter with das Ding 
 
 
In chapter 1 of The Sublime Object of Ideology, Žižek attacks Althusser’s 
theory of ideology by making use of Lacan’s discussion of das Ding that 
appears in The Ethics  of Psychoanalysis (The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 
VII). In order to criticize Althusser for still taking an epistemological 
approach on ideology, Žižek raises the issue of the “objectivity of belief ” 
which cannot be defeated or corrected by the subject’s gaining proper 
knowledge. He illustrates his point with the example of commodity 
fetishism: everyone knows that money is a piece of paper, while they act as 
if it were the embodiment of wealth in its immediate reality. Everyone in 
capitalism is a fetishist in practice—not in theory. 
How does this commodity fetishism become possible? It becomes 
possible because the subject misrecognizes itself as an autonomous player in 
market merely pursuing its own self-interests while in truth it is the external 
Things (the social institutions of market) that think and act in place of the 
subject. This inversion of the active-passive relationship between the subject 
and the external market apparatuses is what places commodity fetishism well 
out of the range of the usual kind of criticism which simply condemns it as a 
subjective illusion. Our fetishistic belief in money, in other words, is not 
really ours but the objective belief that Things themselves have for us. 
Žižek generalizes this point by linking it to the question of external 
obedience to the law. What he means by this is the subject’s obedience in its 
external behavior: if it behaves according to the law, it does not matter 
whether it truly believes that the law is right. He argues that such external 
obedience is not the same as submission to the nonideological “brute force” 
represented in Althusser’s theory by the repressive state apparatus; it is rather 
what remains totally unthought of by Althusser, namely “obedience to the 
8
Décalages, Vol. 1 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 2
s: holar.oxy.edu/ ecalages/vol1/iss2/2
Choi: From or Toward the Symbolic? 
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Command in so far as it is ‘incomprehensible,’ not understood; in so far as it
 
retains a ‘traumatic’ ‘irrational’ character” (Žižek 1989, p. 37). 
Now we can clearly see that this is the same kind of argument Lacan 
makes in his Seminar VII while discussing the role of das Ding in establishing 
the authority of moral commands. The mute Wort als Ding (le mot rather than 
la parole, and the signifier without the signified) is precisely what seems to 
the subject incomprehensible, traumatic and irrational. “Das Ding,” says 
Lacan, “is that which I will call the beyond-of-the-signified” (1992, p. 54). It 
is the signifier (or a chain of signifiers) that is not yet experienced by the 
subject as a meaning, but simply imposed upon it from without as a 
persisting piece of reality. This is ultimately what Lacan refers to as the real: 
“that dumb reality which is das Ding” (p. 55).3 Why dumb? It is because it 
does not yet generate any meaning for the subject to understand; all it does is 
to stubbornly refer to itself as a signifier. Lacan identifies this dumb self- 
referential characteristic of the signifier as the secret source of the authority 
of moral commands by associating it with the (social) “reality principle” 
capable of restraining the subject’s “pleasure principle.” He argues that the 
Kantian categorical imperative as a pure structure lacking any empirical 
content or meaning is das Ding par excellence. It is from this standpoint that 
Žižek launches a full attack on Althusser: 
 
 
Althusser speaks only of the process of ideological interpellation 
through which the symbolic machine of ideology is ‘internalized’ 
into the ideological experience of Meaning and Truth: but we can 
learn from Pascal that this ‘internalization’, by structural necessity, 
never fully succeeds, that there is always a residue, a leftover, a stain 
of traumatic irrationality and senselessness sticking to it, and that this 
leftover, far from hindering the full submission of the subject to the 
ideological command, is the very condition of it: it is precisely this non- 
integrated surplus of senseless traumatism which confers on Law its 
unconditional authority; in other words, which . . . sustains what we 
might call the ideological jouis-sense, enjoyment-in-sense (enjoy- 
meant), proper to ideology. (1989, pp. 43-44; original emphasis) 
 
 
Ideology produces a meaning enjoyable for the subject only when the 
latter internalizes its symbolic machine comprised of a series of 
meaningless 
 
 
3 Of course, here one should take into account the fact that in this seminar Lacan still uses the two terms 
“reality” and “the real” interchangeably 
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signifiers als Ding. This internalization/symbolization, however, cannot fully
 
succeed because das Ding qua the real, by definition, resists symbolization. 
There is always something remaining outside of the meaning and truth that 
ideology provides for the subject. This remainder may appear to be a 
completely unnecessary thing which rather gets in the way of ideology’s 
smooth operation; but, in truth, it is what constitutes the very materiality that 
sustains the spiritualized jouis-sense experienced by the subject. In order 
to draw attention to this nonsensical surplus dimension supporting ideology, 
Žižek proposes, against Althusser, that there is an interpellation which 
precedes or preconditions any ideological identification or subjectivation. He 
does so by calling out Kafka as a critic of Althusser. Žižek argues: 
 
 
And again, it was no accident that we mentioned the name of Kafka 
concerning this ideological jouis-sense[;] we can say that Kafka 
develops a kind of criticism of Althusser avant la lettre, in letting us 
see that which is constitutive of the gap between ‘machine’ and its 
‘internalization.’ Is not Kafka’s ‘irrational’ bureaucracy, this blind, 
gigantic, nonsensical apparatus, precisely the Ideological State 
Apparatus with which a subject is confronted before any 
identification, any recognition—any subjectivation—takes place? . . . 
This interpellation . . . is, so to say, an interpellation without 
identi$cation/subjectivation. (1989, p. 44; original emphasis) 
 
 
Hence, the experience of the nonsensical bureaucratic machine that 
Kafka depicts in The Castle,  for example, exhibits the dimension of the 
interpellation without identification/subjectivation, which forms a 
precondition for every possible generation of symbolic meaning. However, 
insofar as das Ding, the Castle, is characterized as something that cannot be 
exhaustively internalized or symbolized, there is always still a remainder or 
a reminder that returns and functions as a postcondition, so to speak, for the 
eﬀective working of the symbolic law. This is why Žižek, right after 
introducing the idea of “interpellation without identification,” links it to the 
idea of objet petit a and the Lacanian formula of fantasy: $ ◊ a, both of which 
in principle can emerge only after the internalization of the symbolic 
machine. Let us also point out in passing that for Žižek this leftover is what 
will linger as something extremely ambivalent in its eﬀects insofar as it 
simultaneously allows the subject a chance to separate itself from the 
symbolic law as in the case of Antigone or Christ. 
10
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At this point, however, I would like to bring in a piece of
 
counterevidence that suﬃciently shows that Althusser’s theory indeed has 
the dimension of what Žižek calls the “interpellation without identification/ 
subjectivation.” Taking seriously the Lacanian thesis that the symbolic law 
arrives in advance,4 Althusser in “Freud and Lacan” argues: “These two 
moments [of the imaginary and the symbolic] are dominated, governed and 
marked by a single law, the law of the symbolic. . . . [T]he moment of the 
imaginary [is] the first moment in which the child lives its immediate 
intercourse with a human being (its mother) without recognizing it practically 
as the symbolic intercourse it is (i.e., as the intercourse of a small human child 
with a human mother)” (1971, p. 210; original emphasis). 
Contrary to Žižek’s claim, Althusser here clearly acknowledges the 
bare existence of the symbolic machine at work that is not yet experienced 
by an individual (the child) as the meaning and truth of the law. The child’s 
initial intercourse with the mother is an immediate one; there are no 
meanings produced yet. The child only experiences the mother als Ding—the 
Thing 
that speaks—and not as a “human mother” loaded with meanings. In 
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” too, Althusser insists on the 
Pascalian thesis—“Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will 
believe”—in order to indicate that it is the subjection (and not the 
subjectivation)5 of an individual to the rituals themselves that is both 
logically primary and chronologically prior in every ideological 
interpellation: “[An individual’s] ideas are his material actions inserted into 
material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves 
defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of 
that subject” (1971, p. 169). Hence, it is only natural that the nonsensical, 
self- referential, dumb characteristic of the law that Žižek reveals with the 
tautological proposition, “Law is Law” (1989, p. 36), is in fact one of the 
crucial points that Althusser himself makes while discussing the example of 
Christian religious ideology. The only diﬀerence here is that, for Althusser, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Lacan’s own thesis can be found in “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in 
Psychoanalysis” (2006, p. 231). 
 
5 Subjectivation takes place at the level of signification, allowing the subject a full access to the meanings 
of signs; whereas subjection (assujetissement) takes place at the level of affects, forcing the bodily 
submission of an individual to meaningless signifiers. 
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the prominent example is found in the biblical story of Moses: that is, God’s
 
answer to him, “I am that I am” (1971, p. 179), instead of “Law is Law.”6 
Yet, is it not also such a tautological characteristic of the law that Lacan 
points out at the very end of his exposition of the lower level of the graph of 
desire? Lacan writes in “The Subversion of the Subject”: 
 
 
Let us set out from the conception of the Other as the locus of the 
signifier. Any statement of authority has no other guarantee than its very 
enunciation, and it is pointless for it to seek it in another signifier, 
which could not appear outside this locus in any way. Which is what I 
mean when I say that no metalanguage can be spoken, or, more 
aphoristically, that there is no Other of the Other. (2006, p. 311; 
emphasis added) 
 
 
It is up to this point that Althusser more or less seems to agree with Lacan. 
What he does not really agree with is Lacan’s construction of the upper level 
of the graph of desire. What is the reason for this disagreement, then? 
Before we proceed with such a question, however, let us discuss another 
crucial point that Althusser makes with respect to the nature of the child- 
mother relationship in “Freud and Lacan.” His claim is quite surprising: he 
maintains that the initial relationship that the child has with the mother is the 
imaginary one rather than the real. We should be clear about this. For 
Althusser, what is imaginary is not the mother herself as a Thing, but the 
immediate relationship that the child has with her before it enters the 
symbolic order proper. Therefore, to characterize the relationship between the 
child and the mother as imaginary does not necessarily mean that the 
dimension of the real is ignored. It means, instead, that the relationship 
between the imaginary and the real is thought of in a more complicated way. 
They are not caught up in the epistemological dichotomy of the true and the 
 
 
 
6 For this reason, Judith Butler, for example, argues in her essay “Althusser’s Subjection”: “[T]he point, 
both Althusserian and Lacanian, [is] that the anticipations of grammar are always and only retroactively 
installed. . . . Wittgenstein remarks, ‘We speak, we utter words, and only later get a sense of their life.’ 
Anticipation of such sense governs the ‘empty’ ritual that is speech, and ensures its iterability. In this sense, 
then, we must neither first believe before we kneel nor know the sense of the words before we 
speak” (1997, p. 124; emphasis added). Mladen Dolar (1993), on the other hand, tries to supplement 
Žižek’s original criticism of Althusser by making a further claim that Althusser misses the crucial difference 
that separates his emphasis on the “non-sensical materiality” of institutions and practices from Lacan’s own 
emphasis on the “immaterial” characteristic of the “symbolic automatism.” Although I cannot engage here 
in a full discussion of Dolar’s position, I would still want to point out that this is merely a fictive issue 
Dolar himself created, since it is above all Lacan who emphasizes that what gives rise to “repetition 
automatism” is “the materiality of the signifier” (2006, p. 10; p. 16). 
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false. This is precisely why later in “Ideology and Ideological State
 
Apparatuses” Althusser defines ideology not simply as a distorted 
representation of the real but as “a ‘representation’ of the imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (1971, p. 
162). Then, what is represented in ideology with more or less distortions is 
not the real itself, but individuals’ imaginary relationship to it, that is to say, 
the specific way or mode in which individuals live or experience the real. 
Therefore, ideology is neither a lie fabricated by “Priests or Despots” for the 
purpose of deceiving the masses (the Hobbesian idea of ideology), nor a 
result of the general ignorance of the masses (the Platonist idea of ideology). 
Nor is it even an illusory product of alienation or alienated labor (the 
Feuerbachian idea of ideology that Marx follows in The Jewish Question).7  It 
is, rather, a social relationship that is as material as other kinds of social 
relationships (for example, the economical one). It is a relationship in which 
concrete individuals are interpellated into subjects of the society. The Kantian 
idea of constituting subjects is substituted for by the structuralist idea of 
constituted subjects. Althusser writes: “The category of the subject is only 
constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function (which 
defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects” (1971, p. 171) 
Let us, however, pay attention right away to the fact that what we see in 
Althusser’s final formulation of ideology is the imaginary and the real—not 
the symbolic. Throughout the essay, “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses,” he never uses the term “symbolic.” This is quite astonishing, 
since, according to Žižek, what Althusser lacks is the real, and not the 
symbolic. Why this discrepancy? From my point of view, it is because 
Althusser views the lower level of the graph of desire as the imaginary and 
the upper level as the symbolic (he just avoids theorizing ideology in terms 
of the pure symbolic), whereas Žižek sees the lower level as the symbolic, 
and the upper level as the symbolic cut through by the real (jouissance). Then, 
how about Lacan’s own account of the graph? His perspective laid out in 
“The Subversion of the Subject” is much closer to Althusser’s view than to 
Žižek’s. 
Žižek, by imposing his own view upon Lacan’s graph of desire, not only 
distorts his intention behind the construction of the graph of desire but also 
makes Althusser’s criticism of the upper level unintelligible. 
 
 
3. The Issue of the Upper Level of the Lacanian Graph of Desire 
 
 
 
7 Cf. Balibar, 1993, p. 12. 
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What is the central question that Lacan tries to answer when he constructs
 
the graph of desire? We can properly locate this question where Lacan makes 
a transition from the explanation of the lower level to that of the upper level. 
Right after he concludes his discussion of the lower level by pointing out the 
tautological nature of the authority of the law, Lacan states: 
 
 
The fact that the Father may be regarded as the original representative 
of this authority of the Law requires us to specify by what privileged 
mode of presence he is sustained beyond the subject who is led to 
really occupy the place of the Other, namely, the Mother. The question 
is thus pushed back a step. (2006, p. 688) 
 
 
Reading such a statement, we realize that the big Other that we encounter at 
the lower level of the graph is not the father, but actually the mother.8 The 
whole construction of the upper level, then, was intended to show why the 
symbolic order of the father is still necessary besides the imaginary order of 
the mother, and how the transition is made from the latter to the former. 
This is also why, toward the end of the discussion of the upper level, Lacan 
confirms: “The shift of (-φ) (lowercase phi) as phallic image from one side to 
the other of the equation between the imaginary and the symbolic renders it
 
positive in any case, even if it fills a lack. Although it props up (-1), it 
becomes Φ (capital phi), the symbolic phallus that cannot be negativized, the 
signifier of jouissance” (2006, p. 697). Through what, then, does this
 
transition from the imaginary to the symbolic occur? It only occurs through 
“castration,” which is found at the right hand corner of the upper level, which 
truly ends the whole graph of desire. 
Hence, as Althusser argues, what the lower level depicts is the 
imaginary relationship that the child has with its mother; whereas the upper 
level describes the transition from the imaginary to the symbolic or, 
according to Lacan’s own expression, the “symbolization of the 
imaginary” (Lacan 2006, p. 695). Žižek, on the other hand, confines the 
imaginary only to the ideal ego, i(a), of the lower part of the lower level of 
the graph, while considering the ego-ideal, I(A), as the symbolic proper. After 
 
 
 
8 Žižek understands this transition in reverse way. After linking the symbolic identification at the lower 
level to the name of the father, Žižek relates the “Che Vuoi?” of the upper level to the function of the 
mother (1989, p. 121). 
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distinguishing I(A) qua the place from which the subject observes itself (a
 
structural or formal place), from i(a) qua a collection of ideal features that one 
can imitate (contents), Žižek argues, “The only diﬀerence is that now 
identification [with I(A)] is no longer imaginary ( . . . a model to imitate) 
but, at least in its fundamental dimension, symbolic . . . It is this symbolic 
identi$cation that dissolves the imaginary identification [with i(a)]” (1989, p. 
110; emphasis added).9 
I would not say that such an interpretation of Žižek’s is utterly wrong, 
since it is Lacan himself who seems to formulate the i(a) and the I(A) 
respectively as the imaginary and the symbolic. However, it must be pointed 
out right away that this simplistic distinction is rather misleading, and Žižek 
seems to fall victim to it. In his Seminar I, Lacan not only says, “the superego 
is essentially located within the symbolic plane of speech, in contrast to the 
ego-ideal,” but links the function of the ego-ideal to the “imaginary 
structuration” (1988, p. 102; emphasis added). How should we then think of 
the two apparently opposing arguments, one of which says the ego-ideal, I 
(A), is symbolic, while the other says it is imaginary? Reading the following 
explanation of the ego-ideal from Dylan Evans’s An Introductory Dictionary 
of Lacanian Psychoanalysis is helpful in understanding the issue: 
 
 
In his post-war writings Lacan pays more attention to distinguishing 
the ego-ideal from the ideal-ego . . . Thus in the 1953-4 seminar, he 
develops the optical model to distinguish between these two 
formations. He argues that the ego-ideal is a symbolic introjection, 
whereas the ideal ego is the source of an imaginary projection . . . The 
ego-ideal is the signifier operating as ideal, an internalized plan of the 
law, the guide governing the subject’s position in the symbolic order, 
and hence anticipates secondary (Oedipal) identi$cation. (1997, p. 52; 
emphasis added) 
 
 
This explanation in itself seems contradictory, because it simultaneously 
says two apparently incompatible things: First, according to Evans’s 
Dictionary, the ego-ideal is something symbolic; second, the formation of the 
ego-ideal “anticipates” the secondary Oedipal identification. Does, then, this 
mean that the symbolic identification is not only diﬀerent from the Oedipal 
identification but also precedes it? Žižek shares the same contradiction, since 
 
 
 
9 I have replaced I(O) and i(o) with I(A) and i(a). 
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he argues that the symbolic identification already takes place at the lower
 
level (what happens at the upper level is just that the symbolic thus 
generated at the lower level is cut through by jouissance, the real); in other 
words, Žižek is arguing that the symbolic identification takes place without 
going through the experience of the castration complex which is obviously 
placed at the upper level. 
We would not be able to solve this riddle, unless we refer to the idea of 
the symbolic that arrives in advance, which Althusser emphasizes over and 
over again. As the Dictionary rightly points out, the ego-ideal is not really the 
result of symbolic identification, but that of “symbolic introjection.” This 
subtle diﬀerence is crucial: it shows that the ego-ideal is merely an 
introjection of the symbolic law which arrives in advance. Although, or 
precisely because, the symbolic law arrives in advance and thus is 
experienced by the subject prematurely, it is not experienced in a symbolic 
way, but merely in an imaginary way. The genuine symbolic identification, 
which is exactly what is meant by the “secondary (Oedipal) identification,” 
only comes after the child experiences the “castration complex,” as Lacan 
later shows in his essay. The primary identification that precedes such a 
secondary Oedipal identification is, of course, the imaginary identification 
whose eﬀect is twofold: the formation of the i(a) and that of the I(A). Both 
formations are the two results of the same process of the identification which 
is imaginary.10 
Lacan explains: 
 
 
This imaginary process, which goes from the specular image to the 
constitution of the ego along the path of subjectification by the 
signifier, is signified in my graph by the i(a)e vector, which is one- 
way, but doubly articulated, once in a short circuit of the $I(A), and 
second as a return route of As(A). This shows that the ego is only 
completed by being articulated not as the I of discourse, but as a 
metonymy of its signification (2006, p. 685; emphasis added). 
 
 
 
 
 
10 Lacan relates projection to the imaginary, and introjection to the symbolic in Seminar I (1988, p. 83). 
Later in Le Séminaire, livre VIII : Le transfert (2001, pp. 416-17), he argues that this symbolic introjection 
is the “primordial identification with the father” that comes well before the subject enters the Oedipal 
situation in which symbolic identification takes place. This is exactly what the symbolic law that arrives in 
advance means. Before understanding the meaning of the symbolic law, the subject is pre-fixed by it at the 
“exquisitely virile” position from which it sees and desires the mother as an ideal ego. Hence, the triangle 
here is not the symbolic triangle, but the imaginary triangle of the child, the mother and the imaginary 
phallus (φ) that circulates between them. 
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Lacan’s last sentence here is decisive for our discussion. According to
 
Žižek, the I(A) is the place from which the subject observes itself. Through a 
“symbolic identification” (and not just through a simple introjection of the 
symbolic), the subject becomes able to put itself in the very place of the 
Other and thus observes itself from there. This also means that the subject 
has now become its own master. Žižek says: “he becomes an ‘autonomous 
personality’ through his identification with [the ego-ideal]” (1989, p. 110). 
And yet we must realize that it is just unthinkable that the subject becomes 
its own master without simultaneously becoming “the I of discourse.” 
According to Lacan’s own argument, however, the completed ego of the 
lower-level process is not “the I of discourse,” but merely “a metonymy of 
its signification.” Lacan’s argument here is only natural because the 
distinction between the enunciation and the statement (énoncée) is supposed 
to occur at 
the upper level of the graph. Žižek keeps bringing what belongs to the upper 
level down to the lower level. He would have been right if he had said that 
the game of mastery begins from the point where the distinction between the 
i(a) and I(A) is introduced; in other words, he is clearly in the wrong when 
he says that, at this stage of development, the subject already achieves its 
“autonomous personality.” The structure and the vicissitude of such a 
dialectical game of mastery are in fact what Lacan attempts to demonstrate 
through the whole construction of the upper level of the graph of desire.11 
 
 
 
11 It is true that Lacan in Seminar I links the function of the ego-ideal to the question of the sight of the 
subject; however, he says that the ego-ideal is the place from which the subject observes the ideal ego. Of 
course, insofar as the ideal ego is also considered the mirror image of the ego itself, we may acquiesce in 
Žižek’s interpretation that the ego-ideal is the place from which the subject observes itself. But Žižek 
further claims that the ego-ideal, unlike the ideal ego, is the place from which the subject can observe itself 
as likable despite its apparent defects (he argues this is why the subject is finally allowed a breathing space). 
In Lacan’s own conceptualization, however, the ego-ideal should be defined as the place from which the 
subject can view itself as likable because all its defects seem to magically disappear. The ego- ideal is the 
“voice” that, by manipulating the inclination of the plane mirror placed at the center of the Lacanian 
“optical model,” makes the subject see and desire the more or less successfully assembled image of itself. 
Lacan argues: “In other words, it’s the symbolic relation which defines the position of the subject 
as seeing. It is speech, the symbolic relation, which determines the greater or lesser degree of perfection, of 
completeness, of approximation, of the imaginary. This representation allows us to draw the distinction 
between the Idealich and the Ichideal . . . The ego-ideal governs the interplay of relations on which all 
relations with others depend. And on this relation to others depends the more or less satisfying character of 
the imaginary structuration” (1988, p. 141). In other words, the ego-ideal is the Other’s perspective in 
which the subject appears as an ideal image. In his more recent book on Lacan, Žižek rectifies his definition 
of ego-ideal, and says, “Ego-Ideal is the agency whose gaze I try to impress with my ego image, the big 
Other who watches over me and impels me to give my best, the ideal I try to follow and actualize” (2006, p. 
80). This new definition is almost the opposite of his original definition, and it certainly approaches better 
Lacan’s own; Žižek no longer considers the ego-ideal as the place from which the subject sees itself as 
likable despite its apparent defects. Still, this new definition, as we can see, is not exactly the same as 
Lacan’s own, which emphasizes the function of the ego-ideal that symbolically structures the ideal image 
of the ego for the subject. 
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As I mentioned earlier, Lacan’s theoretical aim here is nothing but to
 
provide a proper explanation of how the transition is made from the 
imaginary order to the symbolic. Lacan oﬀers three diﬀerent models of 
explanation by making a parallel distinction of three diﬀerent kinds of death. 
Lacan’s three models of explanation are: (1) the Hegelian dialectic of master 
and slave (2006, pp. 686-87); (2) Freud’s “latest-born myth” of the dead 
father who does not know he is dead (pp. 693-94); and finally (3) Freud’s 
“castration complex” which is “not a myth” (pp. 695-98). The three kinds of 
death that respectively correspond to those three models are: (1) the 
imaginary death (this is why Lacan deals with the Hegelian dialectic while 
still explaining the lower level); (2) the real death (the father really died; he 
just does not know that he is dead); and finally (3) the symbolic death. And 
Lacan claims that it is only through the symbolic death that the “subversion 
of the subject” can be properly achieved. What he means by subversion here 
has nothing to do with the revolutionary fiction that Žižek makes up out of 
Lacan’s analysis of the upper level of the graph, namely the fiction in which 
the subject rises up against the symbolic law, and heroically dies while 
simultaneously demolishing it. In fact, the Lacanian subversion of the subject 
is pretty much the same as the Hegelian reversal of the subjective positions 
between master and slave; it is a matter of the slave’s becoming his or her 
own master—an individual—and becoming free. Lacan’s only contention 
with Hegel is that this reversal or subversion cannot be brought about 
through the proposed Hegelian dialectic of master and slave. After claiming 
that the important question to ask is not just the question of death, but 
exactly the question of “which death, the one that life brings or the one that 
brings life,” Lacan says: 
 
 
This is clearly the theme of the cunning of reason, whose seductiveness 
is in no wise lessened by the error I pointed out above. The work, 
Hegel tells us, to which the slave submits in giving up jouissance out 
of fear of death, is precisely the path by which he achieves freedom. 
There can be no more obvious lure than this, politically and 
psychologically. Jouissance comes easily to the slave, and it leaves 
work in serfdom. . . . Paying truly unconscious homage to the story as 
written by Hegel, he often $nds his alibi in the death of the Master. But 
what about this death? In fact, it is from the Other’s locus where he 
situates himself that he follows the game, thus eliminating  all risk to himself 
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—especially the risk of a joust, in a “self-consciousness” for which death is
 
but a joke. (2006, pp. 686-87; emphasis added) 
 
 
Lacan’s argument, therefore, is that the Hegelian dialectic of master and 
slave cannot achieve its goal: the ultimate liberation of the slave subject (the 
child) from the master (the mother). It cannot do so because all it oﬀers is 
just a game of imaginary death, that is, the death that involves no real risk 
and therefore is nothing but a “joke.” No liberation is possible, if no real 
confrontation with death is carried out. 
Then, how about the real death? The real death, for Lacan, is what is 
paradigmatically expressed in the case of the death of Christ. According to 
Žižek, Lacan privileges Christianity, the religion of love, over Judaism, 
Abraham’s religion of anxiety. Žižek argues that Christ is the ultimate 
answer because he is the one who becomes a “saint” by occupying “the 
place of objet petit a, of pure object, of somebody undergoing radical 
subjective destitution” (1989, p. 116). Just like Antigone, he enters the realm 
of the real (that is, outside or beyond the symbolic) by never compromising 
his desire. The relation between him and the big Other is thus inverted. By 
simply 
persisting in his inert presence, he himself becomes a questionable subject for 
the big Other (“Che Vuoi?” or “What does he want?”), revealing that it is 
rather the big Other itself that lacks something and thus desires him qua a 
miserable bodily human being. He heroically embraces his own death while 
accomplishing the impossible, namely, the revolution that wipes out the 
symbolic order of the big Other of that time—the Jewish God.12 
Is this, however, a correct interpretation of Lacan? First of all, Lacan 
never opposes Judaism to Christianity. Second, he privileges Abraham over 
Christ. Lacan says, “There is nothing doctrinal about our role. We need not 
answer for any ultimate truth; and certainly not for nor against any particular 
religion . . . No doubt the corpse is a signifier, but Moses’ tomb is as empty 
for Freud as that of Christ’s was for Hegel. Abraham revealed his mystery to 
neither of them” (2006, p. 693) Therefore, the issue is not laid down as 
Judaism versus Christianity; Lacan puts into the same class Moses, who is 
 
 
12 Žižek first identifies Christ with Antigone (1989, pp. 114-17), and then links Antigone’s act of revolt to 
Walter Benjamin’s notion of revolution (“the obliteration of the signifying network itself” or “the total 
‘wipe-out’ of historical tradition”). Žižek writes: “If the Stalinist perspective is that of Creon, the 
perspective of the Supreme Good assuming the shape of the Common Good of the State, the perspective of 
Benjamin is that of Antigone—for Benjamin, revolution is an affair of life and death; more precisely: of the 
second, symbolic death” (p. 144). In his later works such as For They Know Not What They Do (2002) and 
The Fragile Absolute (2000), Žižek renounces Antigone as a figure swayed by a fantasy of phallocentric 
heroism, while keeping Christ and Benjamin as true revolutionaries. 
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definitely not a Christian, and Christ. Furthermore, the one who possesses
 
the secret solution is not Christ but Abraham. Abraham did not let Christ 
know what he knew. 
Why is Christ’s real death not the ultimate answer to the question of a 
possible salvation of the subject? Lacan answers: 
 
 
We cannot ask this question of the subject qua I. He is missing 
everything he needs in order to know the answer, since if this subject, 
I, was dead, he would not know it, as I said earlier. Thus he does not 
know that I’m alive. How, therefore, will I prove it to myself ? For I 
can, at most, prove to the Other that he exists, not, of course, with the 
proofs of the existence of God, with which centuries have killed him, 
but by loving him, a solution introduced by the Christian Kerygma. It 
is, in any case, too precarious a solution for us to even think of using it to 
circumvent our problem, namely: ‘What am I?’ (2006, p. 694; emphasis 
added). 
 
 
Hence, Lacan’s argument is that one cannot achieve his salvation by 
embracing his own real death, namely by sacrificing himself for the love of 
the Other. He cannot do so because there remains the ultimate question that 
the self-sacrifice of Christ never properly answers: What am I? In other 
words, what is the use of the saintly love of the Other if I am dead, that is, if 
I turn into a Non-being? Thus we see Lacan continue, “I am in the place from 
which ‘the universe is a &aw in the purity of Non-Being’ is vociferated. And 
not without reason for, by protecting itself, this place makes Being itself 
languish. This place is called Jouissance, and it is Jouissance whose absence 
would render the universe vain” (2006, p. 694). In short, without my 
jouissance, the whole universe would be vain. 
On the other hand, it is precisely Abraham who survives the big Other. 
The body of his precious son (the corpse, the signifier) does not disappear 
like Christ’s or Moses’s. What is, then, the mystery that Abraham is holding 
in his hand without ever revealing it to Moses or Christ? The answer is the 
symbolic death, in which one dies a little. Abraham kills his precious son in a 
symbolic ritual, and thus paradoxically brings life to him. Let us here 
remember Lacan’s original question again: “We need to know which death, 
the one that life brings or the one that brings life.” As we already saw, the 
first death brought by life is the imagined natural death of the master that 
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Hegel’s slave awaits indefinitely whereas the second death is the symbolic
 
one through which life is finally brought to the subject. 
Lacan links this notion of symbolic death to the problematic of 
castration complex. He declares this is indeed the moment of the 
“subversion”: “In the castration complex we find the mainspring of the very 
subversion that I am trying to articulate here by means of its dialectic” (2006, 
p. 695). And yet the freedom that the subject finally achieves through the 
castration complex is not a freedom from the law, but a freedom through the 
law. Thus Lacan argues: 
 
 
In fact, the image of the ideal Father is a neurotic’s fantasy. Beyond the 
Mother—demand’s real Other, whose desire (that is, her desire) we 
wish she would tone down—stands out the image of a father who 
would turn a blind eye to desire. This marks—more than it reveals—the 
true function of the Father, which is fundamentally  to unite (and not to 
oppose) a desire to the Law (2006, p. 698; emphasis added) 
 
 
Accordingly, it is just far from Lacan’s intention to show how the 
symbolic law is cut through by the real (jouissance) and thus becomes 
vulnerable, allowing the subject to heroically rise against the law of the 
father and fight it. What is cut through by jouissance is not the symbolic law 
of the father, but the child’s own imaginary relationship with the mother 
which appears as an imaginary game of mastery and control (think of the 
famous Fort-Da game here). Jouissance that results from an infantile 
masturbation stirs up a great amount of anxiety in the child. This anxiety 
which manifests itself in the fantasmatic image of the child’s being devoured 
by its mother, 
can be resolved only by the intervention from the side of the father who 
castrates the child and thus kills it a little. The two deaths, the imaginary 
death of the master (the mother) and the real death of Christ (the child), 
represent the child’s failed attempts to become its own master while still 
staying in the imaginary relationship with its mother. The symbolic death is 
the escape the child finally finds. While being submitted to the law of the 
father, the child is simultaneously set free under the very same paternal law, 
because this law is the kind of law which does not exclude or repress the 
subject’s desire but rather liberates it paradoxically by setting certain limits 
on it. 
Now we can see why Althusser could not accept such a conclusion of 
the upper level of the Lacanian graph of desire. From Althusser’s point of 
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view, all that the upper level does is theoretically justify the necessity of the
 
symbolic law of the father. In 1976, Althusser wrote two essays relevant to 
this issue: “The Discovery of Dr. Freud” and “Note on the ISAs.” In “The 
Discovery of Dr. Freud,” Althusser intensely criticizes Lacan and argues: 
“Lacan thus continued by constituting a whole theory distinguishing the real, 
the symbolic, and the imaginary. Freud, who knew what was up when it 
came to the unconscious, had never resorted to such a theory, in which all is 
conceived not as a function of the unconscious but as a function of the 
symbolic, that is, of language and the law and thus of the “name of the 
father”” (1996, pp. 90-91). We can clearly see from this that one of 
Althusser’s major complaints about Lacan’s theory indeed revolved around 
the symbolic, whose necessity Lacan tried to elevate to the level of scientific 
necessity by famously claiming that “a letter always arrives at its 
destination” (2006, p. 30). Criticizing such a necessity as a teleological 
illusion, Althusser opposed to it his “materialist thesis”: “it happens [il arrive] 
that a letter does not arrive at its destination” (1996, p. 92). Although he did 
not reject the notion of the symbolic in its entirety (for one thing, he kept 
the idea of its early arrival which prepared for the subject an empty place 
within the ideological coordinates of a given society), it seems Althusser 
never accepted the idea that it was possible to make a complete transition 
from the imaginary order to the pure symbolic and thereby eﬀectively 
pacify antagonisms and contradictions through an introduction of the name 
of the father.13  He argues in the same essay (though in a diﬀerent context), 
 
 
That peace [transacted with the father] . . . represents for [the child] his 
sole chance of one day becoming ‘a man like daddy,’ possessing ‘a 
woman like mommy,’ and being able to desire her and possess her not 
only unconsciously but consciously and publicly, either in marriage or 
in the freedom of a love relation, when the state of the society’s law 
allows it. I say that this strength can be quite fragile because if the 
Oedipus complex has not been negotiated suﬃciently well, if the peace 
(which in truth is never completely achieved) has not been suitably realized 
in the child’s unconscious, elements of contradiction subsist in the child’s 
unconscious that then give rise to what Freud calls neurotic formations. 
(1996, pp. 99-100; emphasis added) 
 
 
 
13 Balibar (1994, pp. 168-69) argues that a major point of the confrontation between Althusser and Lacan 
was formed around the category of the “symbolic.” 
22
Décalages, Vol. 1 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 2
s: holar.oxy.edu/ ecalages/vol1/iss2/2
Choi: From or Toward the Symbolic? 
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It would be interesting to juxtapose this passage with another from
 
“Note on the ISAs.” Althusser writes: 
 
 
There are several reasons for the fact that the unification of the ruling 
ideology is always ‘incomplete’ and always ‘has to be resumed’ . . . 
Just as the class struggle never ceases, so too the struggle of the ruling 
class 
for the uniformity of the existing ideological elements and forms never 
ceases. This means that the ruling ideology—even though it is its 
function—can never completely solve its own contradictions, which 
are a re&ection of the class struggle. (1983, p. 456; 1995, pp. 254-55) 
 
 
How can one miss that such arguments of Althusser’s are in fact quite 
similar to Žižek’s claim of “the inconsistent Other of jouissance”? For, as we 
can see, Althusser too claims that the ruling ideology is always 
“incomplete.” What Althusser has is, of course, class struggle instead of 
jouissance. However, it is also true that, for Žižek, as long as ideology is at 
stake, the real implies above all social antagonisms (the two most often 
mentioned 
examples being class antagonism and sexual antagonism). Is it then too wild 
an idea that, at least on this point, Žižek shares more with Althusser than 
with Lacan?14 
As we have seen thus far, Žižek criticizes Althusser for taking an 
obsolete structuralist position, which reduces the subject to a mere eﬀect of 
the symbolic structure. Žižek, on the other hand, characterizes Lacan as an 
exceptional theorist who, by not surrendering to the predominant 
structuralist ideology, opens up a path to a possible theorization of the 
subject’s subversion. He often goes so far as to daub Lacan as a thinker most 
proper to a radical left. However, I believe I have amply shown in this article 
that this description is dubious. Žižek’s portrayal of the debate, furthermore, 
fails to notice that, when the two theorists collided on the question of 
structuralism in the 1960s, the issue did not really concern whether the 
subject was separable from the structure, but how the ideological formation 
as a social practice was to be situated in relation to other social practices 
such as politics and economy. It was actually Lacan who upheld 
structuralism in this debate. I cannot engage with this issue in this article. I 
would simply like to suggest, by way of a conclusion, that the question of 
structuralism seems 
 
 
14 Of course, this is not to say that Althusser’s category of the real is the same as Lacan’s. On this issue, too, 
they diverge as well as converge. In order to discuss their difference properly, I will need to take another 
long detour. 
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to be much more complicated than that of choosing in the last analysis
 
between subject and structure, or between freedom and necessity. We would 
do much better if we stay away from such sterile dual oppositions, which 
themselves seem to belong to a vulgar version of structuralism. In order 
even to properly inquire into a possible theorization of the subversion of the 
dominant ideology, it is necessary to find another set of questions, just as 
great structuralists, including both Althusser and Lacan, once did in their 
own ways. This would be one of the positive lessons of structuralism that may 
not easily be reversed. 
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